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We study the impact of vertical separation between an upstream firm and its subsidiary, 
which competes in the retail market with an independent firm, with the incentive to 
invest in network upgrade. This question is discussed under two alternative regimes 
concerning  the  price  of  the  vital  input  sold  by  the  upstream  firm:  cost  orientation 
regulation  and  absence  of  access  price  regulation.  We  show  that  the  investment 
incentive  decreases  with  vertical  separation  under  both  regimes.  However,  it  is  not 
always true that the investment incentive is higher without regulation.  
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1. Introduction 
In network industries vertical separation is a crucial question. In the electricity, 
gas, railway, telecommunications or postal sectors, for example, there is an ongoing 
discussion  about  the  degree  of  vertical  separation  between  the  firm  that  owns  the 
network (typically the incumbent firm) and the firms that use the network to pursue 
their activity. Vertical separation concerns not only ownership but also, more subtly, the 
degree of the firms’ independence at decision levels. Different firms that belong to the 
same vertical chain may have common ownership although they have some autonomy 
in  the  decision  process.  In  several  network  industries  some  degree  of  autonomy  is 
imposed  by  regulatory  authorities  in  order  to  create  a  level  playing  field  in  market 
segments  where  they  is,  or  where  the  regulatory  authorities  want  to  promote, 
competition.  Some  degree  of  decision  autonomy  corresponds  to  what  we  refer  as 
different degrees of vertical separation. Ownership separation is the strongest form of 
vertical separation (as the firms have complete autonomy at the decision level). Legal, 
functional, accounting separation are lighter forms of vertical separation.
2  Accounting 
separation  is  one  of  the  lightest  forms  of  separation  as  it  does  not  require  decision 
autonomy  but  only  separate  organization  of  the  accounts.  Vertical  separation  that 
involves  some  autonomy  in  the  decision  process  typically  is  accompanied  by  the 
implementation of separate information systems and by the training of employees in 
order to respect “Chinese walls” built between the business units, in order to prevent the 
discrimination  of  independent  firms  by  the  vertically  integrated  firm.  In  the 
telecommunications  sector  most  European  countries  had  already  implemented 
accounting separation, the UK implemented functional separation in 2006, Sweden and 
Italy have followed this policy aiming to encourage retail competition. In the electricity 
sector,  after  setting  accounting  unbundling  of  generation  and  retail  stages  from  the 
network business (transmission and distribution), the European Commission required in 
2003 legal unbundling in order to achieve competitive efficiency (Soares and Sarmento, 
2010). In postal sector, separating the delivery function, which is a natural monopoly 
due to extensive scale and scope economies, from the upstream activities of acceptance, 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the degrees of vertical separation applied to the telecommunication industry 
see,  for  example,  Cave  (2006b).  For  a  discussion  of  different  forms  of  unbundling  in  the 
telecommunications and electricity sectors see Soares and Sarmento (2010), and the references therein.   4 
mail processing and transportation is in discussion both in the USA and Europe (Haldi 
and Olson, 2005).  
A  strong  argument  in  favor  of  vertical  separation  is  the  promotion  of 
competition  by  the  creation  of  a  level  playing  field  in  some  market  segments. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to evaluate other effects of vertical separation in network 
industries,  namely  the  impact  on  access  price  regulation,  on  sabotage
3,  and  on 
investment incentives. 
This paper analyzes the effects of different degrees of vertical separation on 
network  investment  incentives  comparing  two  regulatory  policies  regarding  access 
price:  regulation  and  no  regulation.  We  model  the  different  degrees  of  vertical 
separation following Chikhladze and Mandy (2009). Indeed Chikhladze and Mandy’s 
(2009) definition of vertical control corresponds to our concept of vertical integration: 
“Vertical  control  means  the  extent  to  which  the  upstream  monopolist  can  align  the 
objective of its downstream affiliate with the objective of the overall firm”. Therefore, 
the extreme case of completely vertical integration corresponds to the situation where 
the upstream firm has complete control over the subsidiary firm’s decisions, the extreme 
case of full vertical separation corresponds to the situation where the subsidiary firm is 
completely  autonomous  in  its  decisions,  and  between  these  extremes  remain  all  the 
cases where there are some limitation on the decision autonomy. Foros et al. (2007) also 
use a similar specification of vertical separation in order to study the response of a 
vertically integrated firm to regulatory requirements of non-discrimination. However, 
differently from Chikhladze and Mandy (2009) and from us, Foros et al. (2007) assume 
that the vertically integrated firm does not passively accommodate the regulatory policy 
on vertical separation. Instead, the vertically integrated firm strategically decides how 
much autonomy should be given to affiliate firms and this strategy might reverse the 
expected results from non-discrimination regulation.  
There are other recent works that also study the relationship between the degree 
of vertical separation and the investment incentives. Cremer et al. (2006) and Pakula 
                                                 
3 Sabotage refers to the no-price discriminatory strategies (such as raising the rivals’ costs, reducing the 
quality of the input delivered to competitors, reducing rivals’ demands) followed by the firm that sells the 
network access. For deep analysis of  sabotage  see Weisman (1998), Economides (1998), Sibley and 
Weisman (1998), Mandy (2000), Weisman and Kang (2001), Beard et al. (2001), Mandy (2007) and 
Chikhladze and Mandy (2009). 
   5 
and Götz (2010) study the effects of different organizational structures on the network 
operator’s incentive to invest. Höffler and Kranz (2008) compare legal unbundling with 
completely  vertical  integration  and  full  vertical  separation.  However,  these  works 
analyze the different market structures independently, as they build different models for 
each one. On the contrary, in the approach of Chikhladze and Mandy (2009), Foros et 
al. (2007) and ours, there is a unique model that integrates all the different degrees of 
vertical  separation.  Hence,  legal  separation  defined  by  Höffler  and  Kranz  (2008)  is 
represented in our model as an intermediate case, while completely vertical integration 
and full vertical separation are the extreme  cases. Besides the  above references our 
paper is also related to the literature on vertical integration, unbundling, access price 
regulation and investment incentives. Buehler et al. (2004) study the effects of vertical 
separation  on  investment  incentives  considering  also  the  impact  of  access  price 
regulation.  Rey  and  Tirole  (2006)  provide  a  survey  on  vertical  integration  and 
foreclosure, Guthrie (2006) offer a survey on the infrastructure investment implications 
of  different  regulatory  regimes.  Cambini  and  Jiang  (2009)  provide  a  survey  on  the 
relationship between investment incentives and regulation applied to internet broadband 
access. Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006) analyze the effects of access price regulation 
on the incentive to invest considering a vertical integration. 
When  network  access  is  a  vital  input  to  independent  firms,  the  relationship 
between  vertical  separation  and  network  investment  incentives  must  be  analyzed 
considering access price regulation. With vertical integration it is usual to find access 
price  regulation,  as  it  happens,  for  instance,  in  electricity,  natural  gas  or  Internet 
broadband access through DSL. Regulators require the incumbent firm to give access to 
some parts of its network to operators that want to provide services but do not have a 
complete network. The regulation of the access price is an instrument to encourage the 
entry  of new operators, increasing competition at the  retail level  and later on, after 
consolidation, the new operators might be able to build their own networks, creating 
competition  at  upstream  level.
4  However,  when  vertical  separation  is  in  discussion 
arguments  contesting  access  price  regulation  usually  emerge.  For  instance,  in  2005 
                                                 
4 This is the argument of the Investment Ladder Theory (Cave and Volgelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006), which 
foresees that initially the entrant firms use the incumbent firm’s network to deliver their products which 
promotes  retail  competition.  After  the  initial  period,  the  entrants  invest  in  their  own  infrastructure 
competing with the incumbent firm also at the upstream segments of the market.   6 
Deutsch  Telecom  demanded  the  elimination  of  access  price  regulation  when  it 
announced its investment plans to build a new generation fiber optic network (Blum, et 
al., 2007). Also, in the USA there has been some reduction in access price regulation in 
some telecommunications segments, as in broadband Internet access  (Bauer , 2006). 
With a theoretical approach Chikhladze and Mandy (2009) show that vertical separation 
and  access  price  regulation  might  be  complementary  instruments  of  regulation. 
Therefore  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  vertical  separation  on  network  investment  we 
consider two alternative regulatory regimes about access price: one without regulation, 
where the upstream firm sets the input price in order to maximize its profits and one 
with  regulation,  where  the  regulator  sets  the  access  price  from  a  cost  orientation 
perspective. Access price regulation and intervention on vertical control are tools used 
by the regulatory authorities, both in the USA and in many European countries, in the 
telecommunication or electricity industries, as documented by Chikhladze and Mandy 
(2009) and many other authors.
5   
  Our  main  conclusions  regarding  investment  incentive  are  that,  as 
expected, the investment incentive decreases with vertical separation, with or without 
access  price  regulation.  Additionally,  we  conclude  that  it  is  possible  to  find  some 
situations  depending  on  the  degree  of  vertical  separation,  where  regulation  leads  to 
higher investment incentives than the absence of a regulation regime. Therefore, when 
analyzing the relationship between access price regulation and investment the regulatory 
authorities must consider the degree of vertical control they demand from the vertically 
integrated firms. 
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:    After  the  introductory 
section  2.1  that  presents  the  main  features  of  the  model,  section  2.2  describes 
downstream market decisions, section 2.3 explains the results under the regime without 
access price regulation, section 2.4 presents the results under the access price regulation 
regime  and  section  2.5  compares  the  two  regulatory  regimes.  Finally,  section  3 




                                                 
5 For a deeper discussion of unbundling and regulation see, Hausman and Sidack (2005), Kirsh and von 
Hirschhausen (2008),  Tropina et al. (2010) and Soares and Sarmento (2010).   7 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  We  consider  an  upstream  monopoly  (firm  U),  which  could  be  the  historical 
incumbent  firm,  that  sells  network  access  to  downstream  firms  (D1  and  D2).  The 
downstream market is an unregulated duopoly where firms compete for quantities of a 
homogenous product. The market structure is represented in Figure 1. 
 






The upstream monopolist undertakes an investment in network quality (denoted 
by I) that improves the service deliver by downstream firms and, therefore, increases the 
final demand. Applying this model to broadband Internet access, for example, we would 
say that the investment increases communication speed and reliability, which are seen 
by  consumers  as  important  improvements  in  service  quality,  not  only  because  they 
might have access to new services that require high speed (such as interactive audio and 
video),  but  also  because  conventional  Internet  services  (web-browsing  and  e-mail) 
acquire greater value (Foros, 2004; Hausman et al., 2001). Then, with a better network 
there will be not only more consumption by the actual consumers but also the attraction 
of new consumers for the market. These features are represented by a parallel shift in 
the retail market demand function. The final consumers’ demand is represented by the   8 
linear function p=1+βI-q1-q2, where p is the retail price, β>0 represents the intensity of 
the investment effect on demand growth and q1 and q2 are the outputs of firms D1 and 
D2, respectively. Notice that we assume that the investment does not affect the slope of 
the demand but only its intercept, ie, the investment increases the reservation price.
6 
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where c is the constant marginal cost of the upstream activity (with c<1)
7, w is the input 
price (with w≥c) and 
2
2 I
 is the investment cost. We assume that the cost of buying other 
inputs is equal for both downstream firms and normalized to zero. Also, we consider the 
non-existence of entry costs and the standard assumption on network industries of fixed 
coefficients technology. 
  Firms U and D1 belong to the same economic group. Therefore, their decisions 
do not depend exclusively on individual profit, but also depend on the degree of vertical 
control.  Hence,  we  consider  the  objective  function  for  each  firm,  following  the 
methodology of Chikhladze and Mandy (2009). As the upstream firm might not have 
full control over firm’s D1 decisions we represent the degree of control by the parameter 
) 1 , 0 ( Î l . The objective functions for each firm are represented as follows: 
Firm I (integrated firm): 
2
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6 This assumption was also used by Sarmento and Brandão (2007). 
7 We assume that the investment does not change marginal costs c. Höffler and Kranz (2008), Sarmento 
and  Brandão  (2009)  and  Vareda  (2010)  consider  a  different  approach  as  they  assume  that  upstream 
investment reduces marginal costs.   9 
  This model allows an integrated analysis of all the possible cases of vertical 
separation,  from  complete  vertical  integration  to  full  vertical  separation.  Under 
complete  vertical  integration  (represented  by  λ=0)  firms  U  and  D1  have  the  same 
objective function: both maximize the integrated profit; under full vertical separation 
(represented by λ=1) firm U maximizes the integrated profit, while firm D1 maximizes 
its individual profit from retail business. This happens when firms U and D1, in spite of 
having a common ownership, develop their businesses in an independent way.  
  It  is  worthwhile  emphasizing  that,  as  in  Chikhladze  and  Mandy  (2009),  the 
parameter λ represents vertical control, not ownership. Also, Foros et al. (2007) use an 
analogous methodology to study vertical control, although Foros et al. (2007) represent 
the degree of vertical control directly on the downstream affiliate firm’s cost function. 
As  mentioned  before,  Höffler  and  Kranz  (2008)  study  with  separate  models  some 
market structures, which they labeled as vertical separation, ownership separation, legal 
unbundling and reverse legal unbundling. Vertical separation and ownership separation 
in  the  Höffler  and  Kranz  (2008)  framework  are  our  extreme  cases  of  full  vertical 
separation (λ=1) and complete vertical integration (λ=0), respectively. Our intermediate 
cases (0<λ<1) represent different degrees of what Höffler and Kranz (2008) call reverse 
legal  unbundling,  which  happen  when  the  upstream  firm  maximizes  a  joint  profit 
function and the downstream affiliate maximizes the individual profit. In our model the 
downstream objective function include the individual profit and the joint profit with 
variable weights (represented by λ).  Our model does not contemplate what Höffler and 
Kranz  (2008)  call  legal  unbundling  as,  in  this  case,  it  is  the  downstream  firm  that 
maximizes the joint profit while the upstream firm maximizes the individual profit. Our 
model is closer to what happens in the telecommunication or electricity sectors while 
the legal unbundling of Höffler and Kranz (2008) is closer to what happens in the postal 
sector, where the essential facility is the distribution network located downstream to the 
firms that need the network access. 
  The time of the game is the following: at stage 1 the upstream firm decides the 
investment  amount  I.  At  stage  2  there  is  a  decision  about  the  access  price  w.
8  We 
                                                 
8 Here we assume, as Foros (2004) that the investment decision has a longer time horizon (it refers to 
infrastructure investment) than the access price regulatory policy. Therefore, we assume that the regulator 
does not have the capacity to commit to access price regulation before the investment decision. 
   10 
consider two regulatory regimes: (i) the upstream firm decides w in order to maximize 
its profits (no access price regulation regime) or (ii) the regulatory authority decides the 
uniform  access  price  with  a  cost-orientation  perspective  (access  price  regulation 
regime).  Finally,  at  stage  3,  firms  D1  and  D2  simultaneously  decide  quantities  à  la 
Cournot. 
  The  game  is  solved  by  backward  induction  and  the  equilibrium  concept  is 
subgame perfection. 
   
2.2 Downstream market 
In  the  retail  market  both  firms  choose  the  quantities  that  maximize  their 
objective  functions  (stage  3).  The  optimal  quantities,  conditional  on  w,  I  and  the 
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  From  these  expressions  some  important  conclusions  emerge.  First,  if  the 
regulator  set  w=c,  the  degree  of  vertical  separation  has  no  effect  on  the  optimal 
quantities.
9  Therefore,  we  restrict  our  analysis  to  w>c,  so  that  the  incumbent  firm 
obtains revenue to cover also part of the investment costs. Second, for w>c and taking w 
as given, the affiliated firm D1 produces more than the independent firm D2, and this 
difference is increasing with w and decreasing with λ. These conclusions were already 
pointed out by Chikhladze and Mandy (2009) and Foros et al. (2007), and result from 
the affiliated firm’s cost advantage that exists with vertical control. In the extreme case 
of complete vertical control (λ=0) the affiliated firm has an “effective” marginal cost of 
2c-w while firm D2 has an effective marginal cost of 2w-c. With full vertical separation 
(λ=1), both downstream firms have an effective marginal cost of w, and therefore, they 
produce equal quantities. In the intermediate cases (0<λ<1) the affiliated firm has an 
effective  marginal  cost  of  2c-w+2λ(w-c)  and  the  independent  firm  has  an  effective 
                                                 
9 This result was first pointed by Chikhladze and Mandy (2009).   11 
marginal  cost  of  2w-c-λ(w-c).  The  difference  between  marginal  costs,  which  results 
from  the  partial  elimination  of  double  marginalization,  is  decreasing  with  λ.  Third, 
taking w and I as given, the total quantity is decreasing with λ. This means that with full 
vertical control the total quantity offer in the market is higher, and this is due to the 
partial elimination of double marginalization, as firm D1 has marginal cost of c. Only 
regarding firm D2 are there two margins as w>c.  
 
2.3 Absence of Access Price Regulation 
  Under this regime the regulator does not impose any constraint on the access 
price.  Then,  firm  U  chooses  the  access  price  that  maximizes  its  objective  function, 
which  is  2
2
4 4 10
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l l
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c c I c I
c I w
noreg
.  Here  it  is 
important  to  note  that  with  some  vertical  separation  (ie,  with  λ>0)  firm  D2  is  not 
foreclosed as it happens with vertical integration. With λ=0 (full vertical integration), 
the value of w that maximizes firm’s U objective function l (
2
1
) , , ; (
c I





does not allow a positive profit for firm 2 (this is a well known result from the vertical 
integration  literature).
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  Considering  the  investment  decision  (stage  1)  and  using  the  above  access 
price ) , , ; ( c I I w
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2 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 4 10 + - + - - = x . 
In order to ensure that the optimal investment is positive for all possible values 
of λ we restrict our analysis to cases where β<1,4142. This constraint on the parameter 
that represents the effect of investment on demand is necessary as we consider that the 
cost of the investment increases exponentially while the benefit of the investment is 
linear. Assumption 1 synthesizes the above restriction on β. 
 
Assumption 1: Assume β<1,4142. 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Rey and Tirole (2007).   12 
 
It  is  worthwhile  to  mention  that,  as  expected,  the  optimal  investment  is 
decreasing with vertical separation.
11 If the integrated firm exerts a tight control over the 
decisions of its subsidiary (small λ) then there is a high incentive to invest.  
From  the  optimal  investment  value  and  by  substitution  we  calculate  the 
equilibrium values of the access price (
noreg w ) and quantities (
noreg q1 ,
noreg q2 ,
noreg Q ): 
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  Notice that under assumption 1 the access price without regulation is above the 
marginal cost c for all values of λ. 
From these expressions it is straight forward to verify that the output of the 
subsidiary  firm  ) , , ( 1 c q
noreg l b   is  decreasing  with  vertical  separation.  This  is  the 
expected  result  since  with  an  increase  in  vertical  separation  the  real  costs  of  the 
downstream  firms  get  closer.  Following  this  reasoning  we  could  expect  that  the 
independent firm’s output  ) , , ( 2 c q
noreg l b  increases with vertical separation, however, 
this does not happen when β and λ are relatively high (more precisely,  when β>1.354 
and l > 2 l  with 
8 3








l ). This result is due to the effect 
of vertical separation on demand, through the investment. With a high degree of vertical 
separation there is a low incentive to invest, that affects negatively the demand growth 
and so the independent firm’s output.  Therefore, there is a tradeoff regarding the effects 
of  vertical  separation  on  ) , , ( 2 c q
noreg l b .  When  the  investment  effect  on  demand  is 
strong  ) , , ( 2 c q
noreg l b   decreases  but,  in  the  opposite  case,  the  effect  of  vertical 
separation  on  the  creation  of  a  level  playing  field  dominates  and  ) , , ( 2 c q
noreg l b  
                                                 
11 This result is consistent with the main conclusions of Buehler et al. (2004).   13 
increases. Also, the subsidiary’s output is higher than the independent’s output, except 
when there is full vertical separation. This is the expected result as more vertical control 
increases the cost advantage of the subsidiary firm.  
Concerning  the  effects  of  vertical  control  on  total  output  (and  on  consumer 
welfare  as  here  the  consumer  welfare  is  given  by 
2
2 Q
CS = ),    we  conclude  that  an 
increase  in  vertical  separation  decreases  consumer  welfare  except  when  the  vertical 
separation is already very high ( 1 l l > with  2
4 2 2
1 2





- + - +
=  ) and β 
is low (β <0.70711). Once again, this result is due to the effect of vertical separation on 
demand,  through  the  investment.  An  increase  in  vertical  separation  decreases  the 
incentive to invest and, if β is not too low, the demand expansion is narrow. For low 
values  of  β  the  link  between  investment  and  demand  is  weak,  and  so  the  effect  of 
vertical separation on consumer welfare varies with the degree of vertical separation. 
When vertical separation is low we have the same effect as with high β, however, when 
vertical separation is high a further increased in vertical separation produces positive 
effects  on  consumer  welfare.  This  is  explained  by  the  positive  effect  of  vertical 
separation on the promotion of retail competition that overcomes the negative effects. 
The above results are very relevant to policies that defend vertical separation arguing 
for the promotion of retail competition and the creation of a level playing field in the 
retail market, neglecting the important effects on investment incentive and efficiency. 
Foros et al. (2007) already claim the attention for this feature of non-discrimination 
policies, as they may increase consumer prices. 
 
2.4 Access Price Regulation 
Under  this  regime  the  regulator  adopts  a  cost-based  perspective,  setting  the 
access price as the marginal cost of providing the access (c) plus a fraction (α) of the 
investment total cost, that is, w = c+αC(I), with α<1.
12 With this regulatory policy firm 




= a . Then, the access price is equal to the marginal cost of providing the 
                                                 
12 We follow the definition of cost based regulation described in Sarmento and Brandão (2007).   14 
access plus the average cost of the investment. This means that the independent firm 
bears a fraction of the investment cost undertaken by the upstream firm in order to 
expand  the  demand.  Both  downstream  firms  benefit  from  the  investment  and  this 
justifies an access price above marginal cost (this is consistent with the observation of 
an access price above marginal cost in order to cover fixed costs of the upstream firm, 
as for instance, the Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) used by regulators). 
  Considering  now  stage  1  of  the  game,  we  calculate  the  investment  that 
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2 2 + + - - - = y .  Assumption  1  ensures  that  the  optimal 
investment is positive for all possible values of λ. 
As expected, the optimal investment is decreasing with the degree of vertical 
separation.  If  the  integrated  firm  exerts  a  tight  control  over  the  decisions  of  its 
subsidiary there is a high incentive to invest.  
Substituting the optimal investment value we calculate the equilibrium values of 
the access price (
reg w ) and quantities (
reg q1 ,
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It is straight forward to verify that, as expected, the access price with regulation 
is lower than without regulation. 
From the optimal quantities we verify that the output of the subsidiary firm is 
decreasing with vertical separation. For the independent’s firm output we find a similar 
result as without regulation: it is decreasing with vertical separation except for high 
values  of  β  and  λ  (in  this  case  for  β>1.2096  and  λ>λ1  with   15 
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l .  Also,  we  find  that  the  subsidiary’s  firm 
output is higher than the independent’s firm output, except in the extreme case of full 
vertical separation (λ=0) where both firms produce the same output. 
Regarding the effect of vertical control on consumer welfare (measured by the 
value of total output) we conclude that an increase on vertical separation always has a 
negative effect on consumer welfare. This is a different result from what we obtained 
without regulation, where we found some cases where consumer welfare increases as a 
response  to  more  vertical  separation.  With  access  price  regulation  a  deeper  vertical 
separation not only has negative effects on investment but also on consumer welfare.  
 
2.5. Comparison of the Two Regimes 
The main objective of the paper is to evaluate the effects of vertical separation 
on  the  incentives  to  invest  considering  two  different  regimes  concerning  the  access 
price. We conclude that the investment is higher without regulation for any degree of 
vertical  separation  as  long  as  the  impact  of  the  investment  on  demand  growth  is 
significant (β>1.25). For intermediate values of β (0.9736<β<1.25) the investment can 
be high without regulation depending on the degree of vertical separation: for low levels 
of vertical separation the investment is higher without regulation, but for high levels of 
vertical separation we have the opposite result. Finally, when β is low (β<0.97367) the 
access price regulation allows a higher investment than no regulation, for any degree of 
vertical separation.  This last result is unexpected. The aim of access price regulation is 
to  protect  the  independent  firms;  however,  the  negative  impact  on  investment  is 
traditionally pointed as one crucial drawback of this regulatory policy. Here we show 
that  it  is  very  important  to  consider  vertical  separation  in  order  to  evaluate  the 
relationship  between  investment  incentive  and  access  price  regulation.  Considering 
vertical separation we show that it is not always true that access price regulation lowers 
investment incentives. 
The above results are aligned with Chikhladze and Mandy (2009) conclusions. 
In their study of sabotage incentives, these authors conclude that when access price is 
above marginal cost, strong vertical control decreases sabotage incentives. Therefore, it 
might  be  optimal  to  have  access  price  regulation  and  vertical  integration  (indeed,   16 
Chikhladze and Mandy (2009) conclude that access price regulation and vertical control 
policy can be complements). Here we conclude that vertical separation implemented 
with access price regulation decreases investment incentives and in some cases can also 
decrease  consumer  surplus.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  a  careful  analyzes  of  regulatory 





  We  conclude  that  under  both  regimes  concerning  access  price  definition  the 
impact of vertical separation on the independent firm’s market position depends on the 
intensity of investment effect on demand. This is so because there is a trade-off between 
the low increase in demand (caused by low investment) and the creation of a level 
playing field in the downstream market.  
Regarding the effect of vertical separation on consumer surplus we find two 
different results: without regulation vertical separation not always reduces consumer 
welfare while with access price regulation vertical separation always reduces consumer 
welfare. These results call for the attention of regulatory bodies when evaluating the 
possibility of maintaining access price regulation and simultaneously demanding deeper 
vertical separation from incumbent firms. The argument for vertical separation lies in 
the promotion of retail competition, but this might be achieved at consumer surplus 
expenses. 
Concerning  the  investment,  we  conclude  that  the  optimal  level  is  decreasing 
with  vertical  separation  with  or  without  access  price  regulation.  However,  when 
comparing the optimal investment values that result from the two regimes we conclude 
that it is possible to find some situations where regulation leads to higher investment 
incentives. Therefore, in the relationship between regulation and investment is crucial to 
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